St. John's Law Review
Volume 41
Number 1 Volume 41, July 1966, Number 1

Article 34

CPLR 4102: Motion to Frame Issues for Jury Trial Abolished
St. John's Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

1966]

NEW YORK PRACTICE COVERAGE

tionally distinct,1 33 are substantially the same. Practically speaking,
B's negligence in the first action would most assuredly be his
contributory negligence in the second. Since the issue in the two
cases is essentially the same, it would seem that the court should
have allowed A to assert the defense of collateral estoppel. In
addition, this view might be further supported by taking into
account the jury's gratuitous holding as to B's negligence. Although
as the cases indicate, this would not, in and of itself, be a basis for
the employment of collateral estoppel, it does lend support for the
use of estoppel in this case. Since the modern liberal procedures
on counterclaims will assure a day in court, the use of collateral
estoppel in situations such as the one described might have the
benefit of consolidating suits and reducing congested court calendars.
On the other hand, it is important to note certain practical
considerations which might have adversely motivated the court. If
the defense of collateral estoppel had been permitted herein, it is
quite possible that injustices might result in numerous other situations. For example, if a bus containing forty passengers were to
crash, injuring them, a suit by one passenger which was decided
in favor of the bus company woxld automatically preclude the other
thirty-nine. Thus, it is possible to envision the possibility of
collusive suits. Moreover, an unreasonable burden might be placed
upon those who decided to wait and to investigate the nature and
extent of their injuries. Although these practical considerations
probably influenced the court, the alternative conclusion, viz., the
application of collateral estoppel and the prevention of repetitious
litigation, seems preferable.
The practitioner should note, however, that although this case
does not apply the mutuality requirement that was abolished in
Israel, it does reveal that the courts will probably closely scrutinize
and investigate the issues involved in light of the practical consequences of permitting collateral estoppel.
ARTICLE

CPLR 4102.:

41-

TRIAL BY A JURY

Motion to frame issues for jury trial abolished.

In Brown z,. Brown, 34 a divorce action, petitioner utilized CPA
procedure in an attempt to obtain a jury trial by applying to the
court for an order framing the issues.1 35 In refusing to grant
petitioner's application, the court noted that application for an
order formulating the issues to be tried by a jury was a cumbersome
procedure which has been abolished in the CPLR.
133
134

See PnossLR, ToRTs § 64, at 427-30 (3d ed. 1964).

47 Misc. 2d 1046, 263 N.Y.S2d 717 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1965).

135 CPA § 429.
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Under CPLR 4102(a), a demand for a jury trial must be
contained in the note of issue or in a written demand served upon
the parties within ten days after service of the note of issue.13 6
If a special verdict is required, the trial judge, under CPLR 4111,
frames the issue for the jury's verdict. "No longer are motions
for framing issues to be made," 137 said the court, except under
CPLR 4212, regarding the advisory jury.
ARTICLE

44 -

TRIAL MOTIONS

CPLR 4402: Inadvertent reference to insurance in action involving
autonwbile registered in New York not sufficient ground
upon which to declare a mistrial.
Upon the trial of the action in Halsteadv. Sanky, 138 a passenger
in plaintiff's auto revealed, upon cross examination, that he had
given a statement to someone concerning the accident and that he
received $2000.00 in settlement of his own claim. On re-direct, he
was asked whether the person with whom he had settled was a
representative of the defendant. The witness answered, "'he was
from the insurance company.' "189 The defendant's motion for a
mistrial was denied after a poll of the jury revealed that the
reference to insurance did not affect the jurors' determination of
the case.140
The court refused to declare a mistrial based merely upon the
single inadvertent reference to insurance, especially since the auto
was registered in New York. The court stated that New York
has a compulsory insurance law1 1 and the jurors were questioned,
on voir dire, concerning their relationship to insurance companies;142
therefore, to attribute to the jury ignorance of the existence of
insurance in this case would be tantamount to a condemnation of
the jury system.
The CPLR revisors have commented that in light of compulsory
insurance, the matter of insurance will be of limited importance in
136 Such a demand must specify the issues to be determined by the jury
unless a general demand for a jury trial is made. See 4 WwzusTn, KoRN &

NEw Yop- Civm PRAcncE 14102.08 (1965).
137 Brown v. Brown, 47 Misc. 2d 1046, 263 N.Y.S2d 717, 718 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1965).
138 48 Misc. 2d 586, 265 N.Y.S.2d 426 (Sup. Ct Kings County 1965).
-9 Id. at 587, 265 N.Y.S.2d at 427.
MILLER,

140 This court polled the jury under the procedure sanctioned by the Court
of Appeals in Weisgerber v. Ancona, 284 N.Y. 665, 30 N.E.d 608 (1940).
141 N.Y. VEmIcLm & TRmFlc LAW § 312(1). This section makes proof of

insurance coverage a condition precedent to registering a motor vehicle.

142 CPLR 4110 allows a prospective juror to be asked whether he is a
"shareholder, stockholder, director, officer or employee or in any manner
interested, in any insurance company issuing policies for protection against
liability for damages for injury to persons or property... "'

